This article concerns the normative basis for immigration policy. In particular, I consider the implications of three fundamental liberal values, namely democracy, liberty and equality. First, I argue that democratic theory seriously questions the right to national self-determination when it comes to immigration. This is because potential immigrants may be coercively affected by immigration policy and, on a standard account of democratic legitimacy, this implies that potential immigrants should have democratic influence on such policies. In particular, I defend these claims against David Miller's defence of national self-determination. Second, I consider the importance of the right to freedom of movement and argue, again against Miller, that this right constitutes a weighty consideration in favour of allowing immigration in many cases. Third, I consider the importance of equality. In particular, I consider an argument for restrictive immigration policies, according to which immigration threatens to undermine social cohesion and so the basis for the welfare state. I challenge this argument in two respects. First, I point out that the empirical evidence for the claim that ethnic diversity undermines the welfare state is not as clear as some have assumed. Second, I point out that this argument for restrictive policies assumes that equality has domestic rather than global scope. Finally, I suggest that even if we are global egalitarians, we should aim for something less than (completely) open borders. 
culture, liberty and the welfare state. Indeed, at the end of the day, an immigration policy (like any other policy) will express values, or some conception of what is fair, good or right. Note that the point is not just that a policy based on values is desirable, but that it is unavoidable. Even an immigration policy that aims only at securing the socio-economic growth of the host society and attaches no intrinsic significance to the interests or rights of migrants expresses values, in this case, those of national egoism.
This also means that a central part of assessing an immigration policy will consist in assessing the values on which it is based, or can be seen to express. However, in political discussions of immigration such values are usually vaguely stated at best, and hardly ever explicitly justified. A case in point is the Danish liberal-conservative government's repeated insistence that its immigration policy is "firm and fair", where it is never explained what it is about the firm policy that is supposed to make it fair. Likewise, when (parts of) the opposition complains that this policy is "inhumane" or "indecent", it is hardly ever explained how, exactly, we are to understand the values of humanity and decency in the context of immigration policy.
The particular aspect of immigration policy I shall be focussing on in this article concerns the issue of open versus closed borders.
An assumption usually made, implicitly or explicitly, in liberal states is that they have an extensive right of national self-determination to limit immigration. Similarly, such a right is explicitly argued for by at least some political theorists (Miller 2007: Ch. 8; Walzer 1983) . However, on the face of it, severely restrictive immigration policies seem in tension with core liberal values such as liberty and equality. As Joseph Carens (1995: 332) puts it: "Citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal privilege -an inherited status that greatly enhances one's life chances." Thus, rich Western liberal societies forcibly prevent poor migrants from entering and gaining access to the privileges their own citizens inherit by birthright.
In my discussion of open versus closed borders, I focus on the implications of core liberal values, including democracy (Section 2), liberty (Section 3) and equality (Section 4). This, I believe, provides an interesting focus because these are values to which liberal states are already committed but have generally not sought to discern the implications of, in any degree of detail, with respect to immigration policy.
My focus will thus pave the way for a critique of existing migration regimes that is internal in the sense that it points to inconsistencies between the values and practices of liberal Western states.
Democratic legitimacy
As pointed out above, liberal nation-states usually consider themselves to have an extensive right of self-determination to limit immigration. In line with this, David Miller argues that while states have such an extensive right, they nevertheless owe rejected migrants an explanation for their exclusion, where: "An adequate explanation will be one that links immigration policy to the general goals of the society in question. These goals will reflect existing national values and will ideally be set through a continuing process of democratic debate" (Miller 2007: 222) . According to Miller's liberal nationalism, while nation-states need to take into consideration the interests of, for example, refugees, they are entitled to give priority to the interests of their own citizens, including an interest in national self-determination. This involves the shaping of immigration policies according to domestic social and economic needs and national cultural values, as expressed through a process of democratic deliberation. 1 However, if we are to see this not only as a process of determining how national values are to be reflected in immigration policy, but also as a process in which this policy gains democratic legitimacy, we need to pose the question of who has the right to democratic participation? On the standard conception of state sovereignty, accepted by Miller, states are only obligated to involve their own citizens in decisions about border control. However, as has recently been argued by Arash Abizadeh, this claim is inconsistent with a standard account of democratic legitimacy, according to which coercive regulation must be democratically justified to all those coercively impacted by such regulation. Thus, the idea is that state coercion can only be justified to the extent it can be justified to those who are coerced, and it can only be justified to them to the extent they have democratic influence on the state enacting the coercion. Furthermore, since border control and the exclusion of migrants constitute coercion, it can only be justified to the extent would-be immigrants have democratic influence on the state that excludes them, which, obviously, they do not (Abizadeh 2008: 45) .
More specifically, Abizadeh (2008: 39) assumes that the core value behind liberalism and democracy is personal autonomy, which involves controlling (to some extent at least) and so being the author of one's own life. Following Joseph Raz (1986: 372-373) , personal autonomy requires: (1) the ability to make plans and to comprehend the means necessary to realize them, (2) an adequate range of valuable options to choose from, and (3) freedom from coercion and manipulation by others. Note that, by virtue of (3), coercion always violates autonomy.
Restrictive immigration policies constitute a threat to both the second and the third dimension of autonomy, because they may deny potential immigrants access to an adequate range of valuable options (namely if they do not have access to such a range in their country of origin or somewhere else where they are in fact able to go) and they coercively prevent such immigrants from entering. In fact, coercion may take either of two forms here (Abizadeh 2008: 40): coercive acts directly and pre-emptively deprive a person of options she would otherwise have had (as when potential immigrants are forcibly denied access at the border, or illegal immigrants are arrested and subsequently deported), whereas coercive threats express an intention to act in ways that prevent a person from choosing an option she might otherwise have chosen (as when immigration laws and practices communicate that potential immigrants will not be allowed access and that certain sanctions will be imposed if they try).
While coercion violates autonomy, the liberal state cannot exist in the absence of coercive measures, and so the question arises how these measures can be justified to those over whom they are exercised, consistently with the liberal idea that they are free and equal individuals. Here, the democratic theory of popular sovereignty holds that coercive measures are justified to these very people by virtue of their democratic participation and thus influence on, the coercive rules to which they are exposed. These rules will then be the outcome of their own deliberation and influence as equals (Abizadeh 2008: 41) . And it is exactly this form of participation potential immigrants are denied. Therefore, according to Abizadeh, existing restrictive immigration policies do not have democratic legitimacy.
This further implies that such policies cannot be justified by appeal to national self-determination, because national self-determination has been illegitimately narrowed down to include only the participation of citizens. Rather, to have legitimacy, restrictive immigration policies would have to be the product of some form of global democratic procedure. In Abizadeh's words, the demos of democratic theory is unbounded. This does not necessarily mean that a "world government" should enact immigration policies; there may be a delegation of power to control immigration from an international democratic institution to nation-states, perhaps provided that they live up to certain standards sanctioned by the unbounded demos. to call this a case of coercion, I suggest that this is because we consider his act entirely justified. But this is not a good reason to resist the label of "coercion". After all, many instances of coercion are entirely justified, including laws that force people to pay taxes (which, according to Miller, is a case of justified coercion). Indeed, we can point out to Miller's neighbour that, unlike potential immigrants who are denied entry, he has democratic influence on the laws that prevent him from entering and that this is at least part of the reason why he can justifiably be denied access. In conclusion, in spite of Miller's objection, democratic theory does seem to seriously question state self-determination when it comes to immigration.
Freedom of movement
While political theorists who favour the right of states to close their borders have often appealed to national self-determination and democratic rights, theorists in favour of (more) open borders have often appealed to freedom of movement (Carens 1992 (Carens , 1995 Cole 2000; Trebilcock 1995) . Freedom of movement -a core value in the liberal tradition of political theory along with, for example, freedom of speech and freedom of conscience -seems to imply that individuals should be free to cross national boundaries and to settle down abroad if they so desire.
To assess the importance of freedom of movement, we need to consider how this liberty can be justified. I shall briefly consider two justifications here, namely an interest-based and an autonomybased justification. According to an interest-based justification, freedom of movement protects some particularly basic interests that individuals have. Thus, freedom of movement protects our interest in fleeing political, religious, and personal oppression and persecution, in escaping famine and poverty, in accessing jobs, educations, and communities (including our families) we find valuable, and more generally protects our interest in pursuing happiness wherever we consider it most likely to be found (Holtug 2010a: 269).
The second justification for freedom of movement I want to consider is autonomy-based. Consider again the Razian conception of autonomy, referred to above. As transpired from my discussion in Section 2, autonomy requires both an adequate range of valuable options to choose from, and freedom from coercion and manipulation by others. Freedom of movement can be said to protect both these dimensions of autonomy because people may be unable to access an adequate range of valuable options unless they are permitted to move and because it precludes coercive efforts by others to limit one's movement. Thus, whether we assume an interest-based or an autonomy-based justification of freedom of movement, there seem to be powerful reasons not to restrict people's right to cross borders and to settle down in another country than where they currently live.
Indeed, given the importance assigned to the protection of interests and/or autonomy in liberal theory, liberals in particular seem under pressure to distance themselves from restrictive immigration regimes.
Interestingly, most people seem to acknowledge the force of (at least one of) these justifications when it comes to the issue of emigration. Thus, restrictive emigration policies are generally considered illiberal and oppressive, as witnessed by the attitudes of most Westerners to such policies of the former communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Presumably, resistance to these policies was, to a large extent, motivated by the thought that they thwarted strong interests among Eastern Europeans in escaping political oppression and social stagnation, or limited their range of valuable options. This is interesting not only because it suggests that most of us acknowledge the force of (at least one of) these justifications for freedom of movement, but also because most people, including most liberals, are much more inclined to accept restrictions on immigration than on emigration. But, in fact, the very same interests and access to options are protected by the right to emigrate and the right to immigrate. For example, just as we may need to be able to emigrate to escape political or religious oppression, we may also need to be able to immigrate (to somewhere else). Here, Miller (2007: 207) suggests that people have a claim to an adequate range of options, but not to any particular option they happen to prefer. This is in line with the Razian conception of autonomy outlined above, but with the important specification that "adequate" is defined relative to generic human needs, not to whatever more specific interests particular people may have. Thus, according to Miller, people can claim access to a reasonable choice of, for example, occupation, religion, cultural activities and marriage partners, but not to, say, the option of being able to enjoy opera. In this way Miller (2007: 207) holds that rights to immigration should be based on basic needs of the kind that would be required to ground a human right. This also allows Miller to respond to the emigration-immigration paradox. In order to be able to obtain an adequate range of options, individuals may need to be able to exit a country in which such options do not exist for them, but they do not need to be able to enter a particular country, and so the right to emigrate is not accompanied by a general right to immigration. There can be no guarantee, however, that every bona fide refugee will find a state willing to take her in. The final judgement must rest with the members of the receiving state, who may decide that they have already done their fair share of refugee resettlement.
The question I want to raise here is whether a state's obligation to allow entry to needy migrants increases to the extent other states close their borders. Miller's answer seems to be "no", insofar as they have already done their part. However, note that in many cases, this is not how we think of our responsibilities. The following case illustrates the point. Suppose that as you are relaxing in the sun on the beach, you realize that a child is drowning. You look to see if anyone else is plunging into the water to save the child, but everyone, including the lifeguard, is in fact deliberately ignoring her. Surely this increases your responsibility for saving her. And this will be so even if, earlier in the day, you already saved three other children. It would not be a legitimate excuse to say that since it is someone else's turn to do their share, you cannot be held responsible. But then why would we want to make this excuse on behalf of states?
I do not mean to suggest that there cannot come a point where states (or beach dwellers) can legitimately refuse to provide further help, but rather that this point is (1) sensitive to the extent to which others do (not do) their part and (2) not simply up to the discretion of agents to settle themselves (e.g. the beach dweller cannot simply decide that saving two is enough -he will have a moral obligation to save a third, fourth, and fifth drowning child as well, whether he acknowledges this responsibility or not). 
Equality and the welfare state
Equality is a further core value in liberalism. That is, most liberals are committed to some egalitarian ideal, and minimally to equality of opportunity. However, the ideal of equality has been used by This means that, to a significant extent, immigrants in welfare states will be unemployable (given high minimum wages, etc.) and so be costly to the state. According to the second, sociological version, immigration causes ethnic diversity and ethnic diversity tends to undermine social cohesion, where social cohesion is a precondition for the sort of solidarity necessary to uphold the welfare state (Miller 2004 ). Thus, people will not be willing to contribute to the welfare state unless they identify with the people to whom they are thus contributing, and they will not identify with these people unless they are, in relevant ways, similar to themselves (I critically assess this ar- Here, however, I want to focus on the normative premise in the argument that immigration undermines the welfare state and so egalitarian redistribution. 4 As I pointed out above, egalitarians differ on whether equality has domestic or global scope and the argument under consideration assumes that it has domestic scope only. After all, the point the argument makes is that the receiving country will experience a decline in social spending and so an increase in inequality; and here, the effects on other states are simply not considered. Furthermore, like the assumption that states have an extensive right to national self-determination regarding immigration, the assumption that equality has domestic scope only is hardly ever questioned in political discussions of this argument.
If, on the other hand, we assume that equality has global scope, it seems that higher levels of migration from developing nations to rich, Western states will actually increase equality. Not only will migrants obtain a higher standard of living, they will also send back very large remittances to their countries of origin. Holtug 2010a Holtug , 2011 This discussion of the scope of our principles of justice also has a bearing on the discussion of freedom of movement in the previous section. There, I argued that people can have strong interests in being able to cross national borders, and that doing so may be necessary for having access to an adequate range of valuable options. However, it also seems clear that there are cases in which it is in the interest of the citizens of a country to limit the influx of immigrants (I shall give some examples of this in the next section).
And when weighing these interests, it will make a difference whether we believe that our principles of justice have global or only domestic scope, because in the former case the interests of all affected parties (including potential immigrants) should have equal weight.
In what follows, I shall simply assume that justice has global scope and thus that, at the most fundamental level, justice requires immigration policies to reflect an equal concern for the interests of citizens and potential immigrants alike. This, of course, does not imply that a state should in fact implement policies that are equally accommodating towards the interests of citizens and non-citizens, because it may be more efficient if there is a division of labour such that individual states primarily take care of their own citizens (Goodin 1988) . However, for this to work, states need to be at least roughly equally equipped to do so which, obviously, is not the case today.
So in order for such an efficient division of labour between states to be compatible with justice, it presupposes a global redistribution of resources, amongst other things.
Why not open borders?
I have now argued that (1) are committed to at least some form of equality of opportunity.
Nevertheless, I believe that the points I make in the following will apply to these alternative justifications as well. The second reason why open borders may not be optimal, again assuming an ideal of global egalitarianism, is that in many cases it will be better to help the globally poor in their country of origin. There are various reasons for this, including the following (Pogge 1997):
(1) the cost of benefiting the globally worse off will in general be lower in developing nations because a given sum of money will have greater purchasing power there, (2) this will also tend to stimulate local markets, and (3) if we want to help the very worst off, opening our borders will not help much, because these are not the people who immigrate. A fourth reason may be that open borders cause brain drain in developing nations, although perhaps it is possible to curtail the effects of this by a combination of selective restrictions on immigration policy, compensation to developing nations when skilled workers are recruited, and making various kinds of training in developing nations conditional on a commitment to stay and work for a given period of time (Brock 2009: 198-204) .
Of course, there will be cases in which it is impossible, at least in the short run, to help people in their country of origin because of, for example, war and state oppression, and so here it is important that it is possible for refugees to immigrate. More generally, it is a
highly complex issue what the optimal combination of border openness, development aid, and global political and economic reform is, where this complexity is due to both the empirical assumptions we make and the ideals according to which we may consider a particular combination just. However, it is less difficult to reach the conclusion to David Miller', Political Theory, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 121-130. Alesina, A & Glaeser, EL 2004, Fighting poverty in the US and Europe. 
